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V
accines are important 
preventive medicines 
for primary health 
care, and are a critical 
component of a nation’s 
health security. Although 
international agencies 
such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the 
United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) promote 
global immunisation drives 
and policies, the success of 
an immunisation programme 
in any country depends more 
upon local realities and 
national policies (Box 1). 
This is particularly true for a 
huge and diverse developing 
country such as India, with 
its population of more than 1 
billion people, and 25 million 
new births every year. 
The current Indian market 
for vaccines is estimated to 
be about US$260 million [1]. 
India is among the major 
buyers and makers of vaccines, locally 
as well as globally, and has traditionally 
aimed at self-reliance in vaccine 
technologies and production. This 
article explores the trajectory of vaccine 
policy in India through its historical 
roots and institutional development, 
the gaps in demand and supply, 
the changing nature of the vaccine 
industry, and the emerging challenges 
in meeting national immunisation 
targets.
Early Origins
The history of vaccine research and 
production in India is almost as old 
as the history of vaccines themselves. 
During the latter half of the 19th 
century, when institutions for vaccine 
development and production were 
taking root in the Western world [2], 
the British rulers in India, concerned 
by the large number of their personnel 
dying from tropical diseases, promoted 
research on these diseases and 
established about ﬁ  fteen vaccine 
institutes beginning in the 1890s. 
Prior to the establishment of these 
institutions, there were no dedicated 
organisations for medical research in 
India. 
Haffkine’s development 
of the world’s ﬁ  rst plague 
vaccine in 1897 (which he 
developed at the Plague 
Laboratory (Mumbai, 
India), later named the 
Haffkine Institute) and 
Manson’s development of an 
indigenous cholera vaccine 
at Kolkata during the same 
period bear testimony to 
the beneﬁ  ts of the early 
institutionalisation of vaccine 
research and development 
in India [3]. Soon, Indian 
vaccine institutes were also 
producing tetanus toxoid 
(TT), diphtheria toxoid 
(DT), and diphtheria, 
pertussis, and tetanus toxoid 
(DPT). 
However, the beneﬁ  ts of 
this early institutionalisation 
did not last long. The policies 
of the colonial government 
ensured that Indian scientists 
were not a signiﬁ  cant part 
of this intellectual legacy. By the time 
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Box 1. Local Realities and 
National Policies That Affect 
the Success of a Country’s 
Immunisation Program
• disease surveillance
• pathogen variations
• incidence levels that qualify for mass 
vaccination
• development and/or procurement 
of vaccines
• choice of technologies
• choice of selective vs. universal 
vaccination (even among childhood 
vaccines)
• logistics, cost-beneﬁ  t analyses, and 
resource mobilisation 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020127.g001]
A nurse at Malipur Maternity Home (Delhi, India) prepares to 
vaccinate a child 
(Photo: the WHO/P. Virot)PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0388
Indians inherited the leadership of 
the above institutions in the early 20th 
century, research and technological 
innovation were sidelined as demands 
for routine vaccine production took 
priority [3]. By the time India gained 
independence in 1947, the Indian 
vaccine research and development 
(R&D) institutions were no longer 
on a par with vaccine technology 
development centres elsewhere. This 
is reﬂ  ected in the fact that improved 
techniques for bacterial vaccines were 
introduced in India almost a decade 
after their introduction elsewhere in 
the world (Table 1) [4]. 
What were the factors that led to 
the stagnation in vaccine development 
efforts between the time of Haffkine’s 
success and India’s independence? 
These included the pressures of 
routine production and service 
functions, ﬁ  nancial constraints, lack 
of institutional mechanisms to foster 
and link up research and technology 
development, and the absence of an 
interdisciplinary approach. All these 
factors posed a threat to India’s vaccine 
development efforts [5].
Vaccine Policy in Independent 
India
One year after its independence in 
1947, India became a member country 
of the WHO and eagerly aligned 
itself to the policies of the WHO and 
UNICEF. Many new Indian institutions 
were established with partial support 
from international organisations 
during the period 1950–1970. 
However, after independence, 
it took three decades for India to 
articulate its ﬁ  rst ofﬁ  cial policy for 
childhood vaccination, a policy that 
was in alignment with the WHO’s 
policy of “Health for All by 2000” 
(famously announced in 1978 at Alma 
Atta, Kazakhstan). The WHO’s policy 
recommended universal immunisation 
of all children to reduce child mortality 
under its Expanded Programme of 
Immunization (EPI). In line with 
Health for All by 2000, in 1978 India 
introduced six childhood vaccines 
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Figure 1. Primary Vaccine Suppliers to the 
Indian EPI in the Last Four Decades 
The data were compiled from the annual 
reports of Health Information of India 
(1970–1971 to 2001–2002), and the 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 
Government of India, New Delhi.
Table 1. The Introduction of Vaccine Technologies in India and Elsewhere in the World
Vaccine Techniques of Production Year of Introduction
India Elsewhere
Smallpox Glycerinated vaccine lymph 1898 1890s
Live attenuated freeze-dried vaccine 1965 1941
Plague  Whole-cell killed bacteria 1897 1897
Cholera Attenuated whole-cell preparation 1892 1892
Agar-grown heat inactivated Vibrio cholerae whole-cell vaccine 1911 1902
Cholera vaccine prepared using modern techniques Not yet 1986
Yellow fever  Live attenuated (passing through cell lines) virus vaccine 1965 1941
Typhoid  Heat-phenolized whole-cell vaccine 1920 1915
Oral Typhoid  1994 (Marketed 
by private sector) 
1984
Rabies Dried cords of infected animals — 1885
Glycerinated cord methods 1907 1907
Hogyes dilution method 1908 1907
1% carbolysed rabbit brain vaccine 1912 1911
1% carbolysed sheep brain vaccine  1930 —
5% carbolysed sheep brain vaccine (India used sheep to manage 
large-scale production) 
1933 1930 (prepared from 
rabbit brain)
5% BPL inactivated sheep brain vaccine 1959–today 1959 (prepared from 
mouse brain)
Tissue-culture-based anti-rabies vaccine 1977 (SII) 1977
TT, DT, DPT Puriﬁ  ed toxoids inactivated with formaldehyde 1920s 1920s
TT Puriﬁ  ed toxoids adsorbed to aluminium phosphate 1972 1963
DT, DPT
Bacillus Calmette-Guerin
Puriﬁ  ed toxoids adsorbed to aluminium hydroxide 1978 1963
Liquid bacterial vaccine 1951 1927
Freeze-dried bacterial vaccine 1967 1960s
IPV Inactivated polio vaccine (discovered by Salk) 1984 (SII) 1955
OPV Monkey kidney cell culture vaccine 1967 1962
Improved IPV, OPV Vero cell culture techniques Marketed by private sector 1988–1989
Measles Tissue-culture-based vaccine 1989 Late 1980s
Hepatitis B vaccine Recombinant DNA technology 1997 (Shanta Biotech, 
Hyderabad, India)
1980s
Source: [4].
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(Bacillus Calmette-Guerin, TT, DPT, 
DT, polio, and typhoid) in its EPI. 
Measles vaccine was added much later, 
in 1985, when the Indian government 
launched the Universal Immunization 
Programme (UIP) and a mission to 
achieve immunisation coverage of 
all children and pregnant women by 
the1990s.
Gaps in Vaccine Technology and 
Production: The Declining Role of 
the Public Sector 
Vaccine requirements for India’s EPI 
have been met mainly through the 
public-sector vaccine institutions, as 
was the case in most parts of the world 
until the 1980s. However, the Indian 
public sector failed to introduce new 
technologies of production (such 
as production of TT, DT, or DTP) 
or to expand production to become 
self-reliant in producing oral polio 
vaccine (OPV) or the measles vaccine 
[6]. Thus, even though successive 
governments have adopted self-
reliance in vaccine technology and 
self-sufﬁ  ciency in vaccine production as 
policy objectives in theory, the growing 
gap between demand and supply meant 
that in practice, India had increasingly 
to resort to imports. 
In some cases, indigenously 
manufactured vaccines were stopped 
in favour of imported vaccines. For 
example, the Pasteur Institute of India 
in Coonoor indigenously produced 
polio vaccine during the period 1967–
1977 with the help of seed virus from 
Dr. A. B. Sabin (who developed OPV) 
and with the approval of the WHO. 
However, the Indian government 
discouraged its production in 1977, 
alleging that one of the batches was 
virulent, and since then OPV has 
become one of India’s major imports 
[4]. Subsequently, the Haffkine 
Institute was able to produce OPV 
indigenously, but this was mysteriously 
discontinued [5]. 
In 1987, the Union (federal) 
government’s Department of 
Biotechnology established a new public 
sector unit, Bharat Immunologicals 
and Biologicals Corporation Ltd. 
(Bulandshar, India) with technology 
transferred from the Institute of 
Poliomyelitis and Viral Encephalitis 
(Moscow, Russia). The ﬁ  rst phase of 
production was based on repackaging 
OPV imported in bulk from Russia. 
The aim was for OPV production 
to be completely indigenised in 
the second phase, within ﬁ  ve years. 
However, the ﬁ  rst phase continued 
(with imports) until the year 2000, 
when such importation supplied 70 
million doses of OPV to UNICEF and 
earned a net proﬁ  t of Rs 8 million. 
Yet, in 2000, the government declared 
Bharat Immunologicals and Biologicals 
a sick unit (a loss-making unit that is 
ﬁ  nancially unviable), and its revival 
remains uncertain.
It is strange that there is no 
published analysis as to why OPV 
production in the Indian public sector 
has failed repeatedly while Panacea 
Biotec, an Indian private sector ﬁ  rm, 
has recently secured a comfortable 
position as a WHO pre-qualiﬁ  ed 
supplier of OPV for UNICEF. Panacea 
repackages its OPV from imported 
bulk OPV obtained from Biopharma 
(Bandung, Indonesia) and Chiron 
(Siena, Italy). Some argue that even 
though India always had an effective 
indigenous injectable polio vaccine 
(IPV), OPV was recommended 
in developing countries because 
international organizations were trying 
to ﬁ  nd new markets for United States 
multinational corporations (since 
market demand for OPV ceased to 
exist in the US and other developed 
countries by the end of the 20th 
century) [7].
The failure of the Indian public 
sector in vaccine production was 
not limited to OPV. In 1984, the 
government took over Bengal 
Immunity Ltd. (Kolkata, India), a 
loss-making private company, and 
revived it so that it could supply TT, 
DT, DPT and other products to the 
government. But within a decade, 
the government declared that the 
company was ﬁ  nancially unviable and 
eventually closed it. Similarly, in 1989, 
the Union government’s Department 
of Biotechnology established a new 
public sector unit, Indian Vaccine 
Corporation Ltd. (IVCOL) at Gurgaon, 
for the indigenous production of 
measles vaccine with technology 
transferred from Institut Merieux, a 
public sector company based in Lyons, 
France. However, the technology 
transfer never materialised, as the 
private sector took over the French 
public sector ﬁ  rm and denied the 
technology transfer to IVCOL [8]. 
IVCOL was eventually closed down, 
and India’s entire measles vaccination 
requirement was met through imports 
until an Indian private company based 
in Pune, the Serum Institute of India 
(SII), started its supply to the EPI in 
1992.
The inability of the Indian public 
sector to recover from its mounting 
failures to achieve self-sufﬁ  ciency and 
self-reliance in primary vaccines is 
also related to the liberalisation and 
globalisation of the Indian economy. It 
is not a coincidence that these failures 
and closures, and the preference for 
imports (while paying lip service to self-
reliance), happened after the Indian 
government liberalised its economy in 
1991 as prescribed by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
It is no longer fashionable to produce 
vaccines in the public sector in India, 
let alone to try and revive failing public 
sector units, even if essential vaccines 
are not available from the private 
sector.
The Increased Role of the Private 
Sector: Distorted Prioritisation of 
Vaccine R&D/Production
One of the main reasons for the 
growing gap in demand for and 
supply of primary vaccines in India is 
that while public sector production 
is on the decline (Figure 1), vaccine 
availability from the private sector 
(Figures 1 and 2) or through the 
UNICEF procurement mechanism 
(based on global tenders from 
suppliers pre-approved by the WHO) 
has not improved. This is a part of 
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Figure 2. The Growth of the Private Sector in 
the Indian Vaccine Market 
The data were compiled from the 
annual reports of Health Information 
of India (1970–1971 to 2001–2002), the 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
(Government of India) and MIMS India 
(www.mims-india.com), Nov 2001, New 
Delhi.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0390
a worrisome global trend that has 
been acknowledged by UNICEF 
(http:⁄⁄www.unicef.org/supply/index_
vaccine_security.html). 
Shortages of primary vaccines in 
developing countries began to emerge 
in the late 1990s. These shortages were 
due to the introduction of new, more 
sophisticated, more expensive vaccines 
in industrialised country markets, 
leading to manufacturers phasing out 
the production of the traditional, less 
expensive vaccines used in developing 
countries. Between 1998 and 2001, 
ten out of 14 major manufacturers 
partially or totally stopped production 
of traditional vaccines. Eight of these 
ﬁ  rms were the main suppliers of 
vaccines to UNICEF. Of these eight, 
six were involved in mergers between 
larger pharmaceutical companies. The 
overall outcome of these developments 
is that the availability of primary 
vaccines to UNICEF has dramatically 
decreased, while the prices have 
increased (http:⁄⁄www.unicef.org/
publications/index_4442.html).
Indeed, the rapid growth (8%–10% 
per annum) of India’s current human 
vaccine market is mainly attributed to 
the new, high-priced vaccines (Figure 
2 and Table 2) such as Hepatitis B 
that have been launched since the 
1990s. There has been pressure 
from the industry to include these 
new vaccines in the government’s 
UIP, even though the clinical and 
epidemiological justiﬁ  cation for their 
inclusion is controversial [9,10]. 
With epidemiology taking a backseat, 
government decisions on vaccination 
are increasingly determined by price 
competition and supply “push” (by 
the companies) rather than “pull” 
(demand) from proven public health 
needs [9].
Many western countries have 
included several other new 
vaccines (such as inﬂ  uenza type B, 
meningitis, measles-mumps-rubella, 
and chickenpox) in their regular 
immunisation programmes [11]. These 
trends are used as a justiﬁ  cation by 
the industry to include these vaccines 
in the Indian UIP in the future. 
Aggressive promotional campaigns 
for the new vaccines and their quick 
adoption by industry-friendly private 
medical practitioners have already 
made these vaccines akin to fast-moving 
consumer goods. The industry, which 
enjoys all the beneﬁ  ts of economic 
liberalisation, sees no contradiction 
in seeking a captive market for its new 
vaccines through the government-
sponsored UIP while at the same time 
failing to meet its social responsibility 
to meet the shortfall in production of 
existing UIP vaccines.
There is another serious 
contradiction that grips the global 
drug and vaccine industry. For curative 
medicine, the pharmaceutical industry 
places increasing emphasis on the 
use of genomics and bioinformatics 
to move toward customised medicine 
to suit different populations. And yet 
in vaccines, the tendency is to move 
toward a “one vaccine ﬁ  ts all” regime. 
This would be ﬁ  ne if the vaccines were 
speciﬁ  cally designed for universal 
use, but there was no attempt to 
conclusively establish that the imported 
vaccines actually suited the Indian 
strains of the pathogens before they 
were adopted. Doubts over suitability 
that have subsequently emerged have 
not been adequately addressed. With 
the decline of epidemiology and 
disease surveillance in India, and the 
main emphasis being on the statistics 
of vaccine “coverage” rather than 
the immune protection achieved, 
it seems that spending money on 
vaccines is more important than actual 
disease prevention. If these trends 
continue unabated, they will lead to 
serious distortions in the vaccination 
programmes of India and other 
developing countries facing a similar 
situation. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
India enjoyed the advantages of early 
initial successes in vaccine R&D and 
indigenous production in the public 
sector, but the country is increasingly 
unable to cope with the growing gap 
in the demand and supply of UIP 
vaccines [6]. The availability of UIP 
vaccines from the private sector is also 
on the decline in India and abroad, 
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Table 2. Cost of Full Immunisation with Each Vaccine (in US dollars)
Category Vaccine Quantity Public Sector Private Sector
Primary vaccines under EPI OPV Three doses   0.03   0.16
DPT Three doses   0.08   ~0.09 to 1.34
TT (adsorbed) Two doses  ~0.01 to 0.02   0.15
TT Two doses   0.01   0.02
DT Two doses   0.02   —
Measles One dose None   ~0.59 to 11.69
New/improved vaccines Hepatitis B Paediatric  None   ~2.80 to 11.30
Adult   ~6.05 to 9.35
DTP-Hepatitis B conjugate One dose None   ~6.79 to 14.03
R-Vac (against rubella) One dose None   0.76
Measles-mumps-rubella One dose None   1.37
Anti-Rabies Three doses, prophylaxis  ~18.33 to 70.20
Six doses, post-exposure  ~36.67 to 140.41
HAVRIX (for Hepatitis A) Paediatric  None   14.80
Adult  28.27
Meningococcal A&C One dose None   1.01
Inﬂ  uenza type B Three doses None  ~23.07 to 24.94
Typhoid Three doses None   5.71
Chickenpox One dose None   27.96
Data compiled from Monthly Index of Medical Specialities (MIMS) India, New Delhi, November 2001.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020127.t002PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 0391
in favour of more expensive new 
vaccines and combination vaccines, 
whose public health need has not been 
unequivocally established in India with 
sound epidemiological and cost-beneﬁ  t 
data [9,12]. Therefore, India (and 
indeed, every country) must evolve 
its own national strategies to meet its 
vaccination needs within its budgetary 
constraints. To do so will require four 
key actions.
The ﬁ  rst and foremost element 
in this strategy must be the decisive 
intervention of the Indian government 
to meet the shortfall in the UIP 
vaccines. This may be done either 
by strengthening the public sector 
wherever possible, or by taking 
suitable (and transparent) measures 
to encourage the indigenous private 
sector on a case-by-case basis to make 
safe and effective vaccines available 
at affordable prices. The suitability of 
imported vaccines to deal with Indian 
pathogenic strains also needs to be 
conclusively established wherever 
necessary. The health security of a 
nation of India’s size cannot be left to 
the vagaries of global market forces. 
With a strong will and a small amount 
of planning, the current situation in 
India can be reversed, and India can 
even play a major role in meeting 
the global shortfall in the vaccines 
procured by UNICEF.
Secondly, India needs to strengthen 
epidemiology and revive the collapsing 
disease surveillance system. This would 
help to decide between universal 
or selective immunisation based on 
unequivocal scientiﬁ  c evidence, as well 
as to respond to the changing disease 
prevalence scenario on the ground, 
which may call for a move from 
universal to selective immunisation or 
vice versa. Some diseases may not need 
vaccinating against at all, and may be 
better controlled by other strategies, 
such as better sanitation, vector control, 
quarantine, and curative medicines. 
National immunisation programmes 
must be led by scientiﬁ  cally established 
public health needs and not by the 
mere availability of a vaccine in the 
market.
Thirdly, a strong emphasis on 
in-house R&D is needed in order 
to ensure that our production 
technologies are in tune with the times, 
and to negotiate strategic partnerships 
with outside scientists or institutions 
and companies. 
Last but not least, the Indian 
government should actively encourage 
independent policy research, cost-
beneﬁ  t studies, and wider national 
consultations on various aspects of 
vaccination and public health so that it 
can take more informed decisions on 
such matters.
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